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Civil Society Networks and the Development of
Environmental Standards at International
Financial Institutions
David B. Hunter*
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of environmental standards at financial institutions is
arguably among the most important international environmental law
developments in the past two decades, yet these standards bear little
resemblance to traditional visions of international law and may not even rightly
be labeled international law at all. The standards are neither treaties nor custom,
although they may reflect emerging principles of international law.' Moreover,
their development and implementation owe less to nation-states, the traditional
monopolizers of international lawmaking authority, than to the financial
institutions and civil society networks formed to influence those institutions.
Environmental and social standards now exist for virtually all international
sources of project finance capital: the World Bank ("Bank") and other
multilateral development banks ("MDBs"),2 the International Finance
Corporation ("IFC"),3 export credit and insurance agencies ("ECAs"),4 and even

I

2

Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
For a discussion of the traditional sources of international law, see Ian Brownlie, Pinciplesof Public
InternaionalLaw1-31 (Oxford 5th ed 1998).
See, for example, The World Bank, OperationalManual: OperationalPolicies: EnvironmentalAssessment,
World Bank OP 4.01, (Jan 1999), available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTFORESTS/Resources/OP401 .pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

3

See International Finance Corporation, Poligy and Peformance Standards on Social & Environmental
Sustainabiiy, (Apr 2006), available online at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/
AttachmentsByTitle/Policy+and+Performance+Standards+FINAL+03-06-06/$FILE/Policy
+&+Performance+Standards+PUBLIC+FINAL-03-06-06.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

4

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD,
Revised Council
Recommendation on Common Approaches on the Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits, OECD
Doc TAD/ECG(2007)9 (june 12,2007) ("2007 OECD Common Approaches").
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many private commercial banks.' These financial institutions ("FIs") have each
established their own sets of environmental and social policies, frequently with
cross-references to one another's standards. This mutual incorporation reflects a
process of upward harmonization driven largely by three factors: (1) crossfertilization of ideas and demands made by interconnected civil society
organizations ("CSOs") and networks;6 (2) recognition by FIs and their clients,
particularly private sector borrowers, that compliance with harmonized
standards would be easier than with a multiplicity of different standards; and (3)
efforts to reflect the goals and objectives of international law relating to
sustainable development
This Article describes the recent emergence of standards for sustainable
finance across a variety of FIs and the implications of those standards for the
progressive development of international environmental law. Section II
examines the evolution of sustainable development standards at the various FIs.
Section III describes the structure and impact of the CSO networks that have
influenced development of the standards and continue to monitor their
implementation. Section IV identifies some of the implications of the
development of these standards for international environmental lawmaking
more generally.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
A. DEVELOPMENT OF SAFEGUARD POLICIES AT THE WORLD
BANK GROUP
The public became concerned over the World Bank's role in controversial
infrastructure projects during the 1970s and 1980s. Projects such as the Sardar
Sarovar dam in India's Narmada Valley and the Polonoroeste highway in the

5

6

The "EquatorPriniples": A FinancialIndustry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and Managing Social
& Environmental Risk in Project Financing (July 6, 2006), available online at <http://www.equatorprinciples.com/documents/EquatorPrinciples.pdf>
(visited Nov 17, 2007) ("Equator
Principles").
As described in Section Ill, civil society monitors the FIs through essentially separate networks
targeting each category of FIs. They are interconnected in the sense that some groups belong to
more than one network and occasionally the networks meet to share information and develop

joint strategies.
7

See generally Gunther Handl, The Legal Mandate ofMultilateralDevelopment Banks as Agentsfor Change
toward Sustainable Development, 92 Am J Intl L 642, 646 (1998) (arguing that sustainable
development policy changes at the MDBs came from a combination of the banks' own
recognition of the relevance of sustainable development, and "shifts in international public policy,
specifically pressure from outside the banks").
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Brazilian Amazon led to worldwide civil society opposition, because they were
designed with limited concern for impacts on local communities and the
environment.8 In response to these criticisms, the World Bank Group began to
strengthen its policies to protect vulnerable communities, to ensure sustainable
use of natural resources, and to encourage greater community participation.9
. These environmental and social policies, collectively known at the World
Bank Group as the "safeguard policies," require, among other things,
environmental assessments ("EAs") of projects before financing is approved,"
compensation for people involuntarily resettled for bank-financed projects," and
protection for certain procedural and substantive rights of indigenous peoples
when projects impact their lands. 12 Key requirements in each of the ten
environmental and social safeguard policies are summarized in the table below.

8

9

10

12

For a discussion of various controversial projects and the reform campaigns that emerged around
them, see Jonathan A. Fox and L. David Brown, eds, The StruggleforAccountabilioy: The World Bank,
NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (MIT 1998); Catherine Caufield, Masters of Illusion: The World Bank
and the Povery of Nations (Henry Holt 1997); Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank,
Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development (Beacon 1994); Raymond F. Mikesell and
Larry Williams, eds, InternationalBanks and the Environment: From Growth to Sustainabiy, an Unfinished
Agenda (Sierra Club 1992). For criticism of development institutions more generally, see Graham
Hancock, Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Cornption of the InternationalAid Business (Atlantic
Monthly 1989).
In the wake of Brazil's Polonoroeste project, for example, World Bank President Barber Conable
announced a major restructuring of the Bank's environmental approach. See Philip Shabecoff,
World Bank Offers Environmental Projects, NY Times A14 (May 6, 1987). See also Tom Griffiths,
Indigenous Peoples and the World Bank: Experiences with Partidpation 2 (Forest Peoples Programme
2005),
available
online
at
<http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi-igo/
wbips-and-particip-ju05-eng.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (citing Polonoroeste and other
projects).
The World Bank, OperationalPolicies: EnvironmentalAssessments(cited at note 2). See also Robert J.A.
Goodland, The World Bank's EnvironmentalAssessment Polly, 14 Hastings Ind & Comp L Rev 811
(1992); Diane M. Kohn, Setting a Standard: Environmental Impact Assessment Policies of Multilateral
Development Banks and Export CreditAgencies, 9 Envir Law 281 (2002).
The World Bank, OperationalManual: OperationalPolicies: Involuntary Resettlement, World Bank OP
4.12 (Dec 2001), available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFORESTS/
Resources/OP412.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also Robert Picciotto, Warren van Wicklin,
and Edward Rice, Involuntary Resettlement: Comparative Peripectives (Transaction 2001) (discussing
experiences in implementing the World Bank resettlement policy).
The World Bank, OperationalManual OperationalPolicies: Indigenous Peoples, World Bank OP 4.10,
(july 2005), available online at <http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/
OpManual.nsf/B52929624EB2A3538525672E00775F66/0F7D6F3F04DD70398525672C007D0
8ED?OpenDocument> (visited Nov 17, 2007). For a discussion of the evolution of the World
Bank's indigenous peoples policy, see Andrew Gray, Development Polify, Development Protest: The
World Bank, Indigenous Peoples, and NGOs, in Fox and Brown, eds, The Strugglefor Accountability 267
(cited in note 8). See also Fergus MacKay, UniversalRights or a Universe unto Itsel? Indigenous Peoples'
Human Rights and The World Bank's Draft OperationalPoiy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17 Am U Ind L
Rev 527 (2002); Extracting Promises: Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries & the World Bank
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Table: Summary of World Bank SafeguardPolides"1

I

Policy
OP 4.01: Environmental

* Identifies potential environmental consequences
of projects early in the project cycle
" Categorizes projects according to the significance
of their environmental and certain social impacts
" Requires EAs and mitigation plans for projects
with significant environmental impacts or
involving involuntary resettlement
" Recommends that EAs should include analysis
of alternative designs and sites, or consideration
of "no option"
" Mandates
meaningful
consultation
and
information disclosure before Board approval
e Prohibits financing of projects involving
significant conversion of natural habitats unless
there are no feasible alternatives and project
benefits outweigh costs
e Suggests that impacts should be minimized and
mitigated where conversion is unavoidable
* Prohibits conversion of critical natural habitats.
* Requires assessment of impacts on natural
habitats as part of EA
* Prohibits financing for projects that would
involve significant conversion or degradation of
critical forests or critical natural habitats
" Allows projects to degrade natural forests if no
feasible alternatives exist, benefits outweigh
costs, and mitigation measures have been taken
* Allows timber harvesting projects only if

Assessment

OP 4.04: Natural Habitats

OP 4.36: Forestry

13

Key Features

(rebtebba Foundation & Forest Peoples Programme 2003). On the safeguard policies generally,
see Environmental and Social Policies: Background, Bank Information Center, available online at
<http://www.bicusa.org//en/Issue.Background.4.aspx> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Adapted from David Hunter, James Salzman, and Durwood Zaelke, InternationalEnironmental
Law and Poliy 1563-64 (Foundation 3d ed 2006) (adopting from the Bank Information Center).
See also Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, The Intent behind IFC's Safeguard Policies: General#
Accepted

Intepretation

for

Audit

Purposes,

(Oct

2003),

available

online

at

<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/poicyreview.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/CAO+Safeguard+Poicy+
Interpretation/$FILE/CAO+Safeguard+Poicy+nterpretation+for+audit+purposes.pdf>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
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certified or plan to be certified as sustainable
OP 4.09: Pest Management

OP 4.10: Indigenous Peoples

OP 4.12: Involuntary
Resettlement

OPN 11.03: Cultural Property

OP/BP 4.37: Safety of Dams

OP/BP/GP 7.50: Projects on
International Waterways

pest
sound
environmentally
* Supports
pest
integrated
including
management,
management where feasible
* Requires pesticides to meet World Health
Agriculture
and
Organization/Food
Organization standards
* Requires projects to avoid and, where avoidance
is impossible, to mitigate adverse impacts on
indigenous peoples
e Requires avoiding or minimizing involuntary
resettlement
e Requires compensation of affected people at full
replacement cost
e Requires public participation in resettlement
planning
* Requires that adequate arrangements are made
for monitoring and evaluating implementation of
resettlement plans
a Recommends that projects should avoid harm to
nonreplicable cultural property
e Requires compliance with national laws
regarding cultural property
review by independent experts
* Requires
throughout the project cycle
* Requires adoption and implementation of
appropriate safety measures
e Requires preparation of EA and detailed plans
for construction and operation
* Requires periodic inspection by the Bank
* Requires notification of each state, agreement
between states, detailed maps, and feasibility
surveys

OP/BP 7.60: Projects in
Disputed Areas

Winter 2008

e Allows Bank to proceed if governments agree to
go forward without prejudice to claims
* Requires early identification of territorial
disputes and descriptions in all Bank
documentation

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw

The cornerstone of the World Bank's safeguard policy system is the
environmental assessment policy. All World Bank-financed projects are screened
into three categories depending on the extent of environmental impacts
associated with the project. "Category A" projects, which have "significant
adverse impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented," must undergo a
full environmental assessment.1 4 "Category B" projects have adverse impacts
that "are less adverse than those of Category A projects. These impacts are sitespecific; few if any of them are irreversible; and in most cases mitigatory
measures can be designed more readily than for Category A projects. 15
"Category C" projects normally do not require any environmental analysis, and
are "likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts." 6 During the
assessment process, the Bank is expected to identify any issues relevant to the
other policies and any steps that should be taken to mitigate environmental and
social impacts.
At the same time that the Bank was developing safeguard policies, it was
also making important changes relating to transparency and accountability.
Foremost among these were the establishment of an information disclosure
policy in 1994"7 and the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1993.18
The information disclosure policy established a presumption for public
disclosure of Bank documents, including critical environmental and social
information. The Inspection Panel is a three-member, fact-finding body that
investigates allegations made by project-affected people that the Bank has failed
to comply with its policy framework.
The World Bank Group's environmental and social safeguard policies,
information disclosure policy, and inspection panel have broadly influenced
similar developments at most other international financial institutions. Regional
development banks, such as the Asian Development Bank ("AsDB"), the InterAmerican Development Bank ("IDB") and the African Development Bank
("AfDB"), largely copy the policies of the World Bank. Although at times some
changes are made by the regional MDBs, development of their policies
inevitably begins with the parallel policies at the World Bank. For example, the
14

The World Bank, OperationalPolicies: EnvironmentalAssessmentsat

15

Id at

16

Id at

17

18

8(a) (cited in note 2).

8(b).

8(c). In general, about 10 percent of World Bank projects are classified as Category A, and
significantly more (about 60 percent) are classified as Category B.
The World Bank, The World Bank Polioy on Disclosure of Information, (2002), available online at
<http://wwwl.worldbank.org/operations/disclosure/documents/disclosurepoficy.pdf>
(visited
Nov 17, 2007).
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Inspection Panelfor the International
Bank for Reconstructionand Development InternationalDevelopment Association Operating Procedures,34 ILM
510, 511 (1995).

Vol. 8 No. 2

Civil Societ Networks and the Development of EnvironmentalStandards

Hunter

World Bank's first information disclosure policy was adopted in January 1994.
By the end of the year, largely identical information disclosure policies had been
adopted by the AsDB and the IDB.'9
B. IFC AND MIGA: EXTENDING ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS TO PRIVATE SECTOR PROJECTS
The World Bank's environmental and social policies were initially
developed primarily with large-scale, public sector infrastructure projects in
mind. Indeed, the private sector arms of the World Bank Group-the IFC and
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA")-apparently did not
have any environmental or social policies until the late 1990s.20 If asked by
environmentalists, they claimed to follow the policies of the World Bank Group,
but they made little effort to inform their private sector clients of the policies.
This changed in 1997, when in response to controversy around the Pangue Dam
in Chile, the IFC was forced to announce publicly that it would henceforth
follow the environmental and social policies of its sister organizations at the
World Bank Group.2'
19

Inter-American Development Bank, Disclosure of Information Polig: Implementation Instructions, (July

20

13, 2005), available online at <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=
859458> (visited Nov 17, 2007); Asian Development Bank, The Public Communication Poliy of the
Asian Development Bank: Disclosure and Exchange of Information, (Mar 2005), available online at
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/PCP/PCP-R-Paper.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
The primary exception to this pattern is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("EBRD"), which has developed a set of policies more reflective of the European nature of the
bank and of the privatization mandate that it claims separates it from other development banks.
As a result, for example, the EBRD has never elaborated policies on involuntary resettlement or
indigenous peoples.
The IFC provides loans to private companies conducting projects in developing countries, and

21

MIGA provides guarantees against civil war, government expropriation, or other political risks.
Both IFC lending and MIGA risk guarantees can be critical for leveraging additional private
sector capital in developing country projects. They are separate, independent organizations within
the World Bank Group, but all members of the World Bank Group share essentially the identical
Board of Executive Directors. In addition, the President of the World Bank chairs each of the
World Bank Group organizations.
An international campaign led by the Grupo de Acci6n por el Biobio ("GABB"), a Chilean CSO,
raised concerns over the IFC's preparation and implementation of the project. Eventually, the
criticism led World Bank President James Wolfensohn to order an independent investigation into
the allegations of the claim. The final report uncovered significant policy violations by IFC and
systemic problems with the Pangue Project. See Jay D. Hair, et al, Pangue HydroelectricProject: An
Independent Review of the InternationalFinance Coiporation'sCompliance with Applicable World Bank Gro95
Environmental and Sodal Requirements (World Bank 1997). It made specific recommendations on
mitigation measures for the project, as well as general recommendations on institutional reforms
for the IFC. For a summary of the project and its role in the development of IFC's environmental
policies, see David Hunter, Cristian Opaso, and Marcos Orellana, The Biobio's Legag: Institutional
Reforms and Unfufilled Promises at the InternationalFinance Corporation, in Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox,
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The IFC subsequently issued specific policies closely tailored to, or in some
cases copied directly from, the World Bank's safeguard policies. In 2003, the
IFC conducted a review of its experience in implementing the safeguard policies
and shortly thereafter announced that it would be revising its environmental and
social policies.2 The new IFC policy framework, which was adopted in April
2006, replaced all existing safeguard policies with one "Policy on Social and
Environmental Sustainability," which applies to IFC's review and due diligence
of projects, and eight "Performance Standards," which apply to the borrowers.
The new system was meant to differentiate between those responsibilities
of the IFC as a lender and those of the private sector borrowers who are
primarily responsible for implementing the project. The core of the new
performance standards consists of the requirements, found in Performance
Standard 1, that all borrowers conduct an environmental and social impact
assessment to evaluate risks and impacts on communities within a project's
broadly defined "area of influence." Borrowers are then expected to have an
environmental management system that can manage the identified impacts,
including implementation of an action plan negotiated with each borrower, to
ensure that they meet all eight performance standards over time. Borrowers
must release to the public the action plans and annual monitoring reports that
track implementation.2 3
In addition to Performance Standard 1, which addresses general
environmental and social management systems, impact assessment, and
community relations, other performance standards address similar issues to the
World Bank safeguard policies. The performance standards that address

22

23

and Kay Treakle, eds, DemandingAccountability: Civil-Sodey Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel
115 (Rowman & Littlefield 2003). See also Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman,
Assessment Report. Assessment by the Office of the Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman in Relation to a
Complaint Filed Against IFC's Investment in ENDESA Pangue SA., (May 2003), available online at
<http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-engish/documents/PangueAssessmentReportFINAL
June2003.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007); IFC, Lessons Learned.Pangue Hydroelectric Project,(Nov 2004),
available online at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTide/ppangue_
summary/$FILE/pangue-summary.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007); Ian A. Bowles, et al, The
Environmental Impacts of InternationalFinance CorporationLending and Proposalsfor Reform: A Case Study
of Conservation and Oil Development in the Guatemalan Petin, 29 Envir L 103 (1999) (describing
problems in IFC's approach to environmental and social issues arising from an oil development in
Guatemala).
IFC, Compliance Advisor Ombudsman: A Review of IFC's Safeguard Polities, (Jan 2003), available online
at
<http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/ReviewoflFCSPsfinalreport
English04-03-03.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("Review ofIFC's Safeguard Polideti).
See IFC, Polify and Performance Standards on Sodal & Environmental Sustainability, Performance
Standard 1: Social and Environmental Assessment and Management Systems (cited in note 3). See
also Elisa Morgera, Significant Trends in Corporate EnvironmentalAccountability: The New Performance
Standards of the InternationalFinance Corporation,18 Colo J Intl Envir L & Poly 151, 164 (2007).
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involuntary resettlement,24 biodiversity conservation, 2 indigenous peoples, 26 and
cultural heritage21 track the general substance of the World Bank's previous
policies. Although critical differences make the language more discretionary, the
IFC's approach still largely mirrors the earlier policies of the World Bank.28 The
IFC also added performance standards on labor and working conditions,2 9
pollution prevention and abatement,3" and community health, safety, and
security3 which arguably expanded the scope of the previous policies.
Because of the IFC's leadership position in global project finance, its
environmental and social standards have become important benchmarks for
other financial institutions. In particular, as discussed further below, the IFC's
policies are largely incorporated into the Equator Principles-the environmental
and social policies endorsed by the leading commercial banks.32
C. EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES
Beginning in the early 1990s, environmental campaigners who had been
focused primarily on the environmental policies of MDBs began to concentrate
on the impacts of projects financed by ECAs. 33 ECAs are public or quasi-public
agencies that provide government-backed loans, guarantees, or insurance to
corporations from their home countries that seek to do business overseas. The
level of official development assistance going through bilateral channels now
24

Id at Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement.

25

Id at Performance Standard 6: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource

26

Management.
Id at Performance Standard 7: Indigenous Peoples.

27

Id at Performance Standard 8: Cultural Heritage.

28

The disparity between the IFC's draft performance standards and the existing World Bank
standards was a significant point of contention between CSOs and the IFC and within the World
Bank Group itself. See, for example, IFC's Review of Safeguard Poliies & Polif on Disclosure of

Information: CAO Comments on the Januay 25, 2006 Drafts of IFC's Polig and Peformance Standards on
Social and Environmental Sustainability and Poliy on Disclosure of Information, 5.3 (Feb 2, 2006),
available online at <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/CAOcomments
onthefinalPPSdraftsFINAL-February22006.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (criticizing IFC for
weakening of biodiversity conservation provisions from those in the World Bank's safeguard
policies). The IFC Performance Standards did improve on some aspects of the safeguard policies,
for example, by explicitly adding social concerns to the environmental assessment process.
29
IFC, Poliy andPerformance Standardson Social & EnvironmentalSustainabifiy, Performance Standard 2:
Labor and Working Conditions (cited in note 3).
30 Id at Performance Standard 3: Pollution Prevention and Abatement.
31
Id at Performance Standard 4: Community Health, Safety and Security.
32
See Section I.D, describing the Equator Principles.
33

In the United States, these organizations included Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth,
Pacific Environment, and the Center for International Environmental Law ("CIEL").
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substantially exceeds that going through MDBs. Collectively, ECAs are the
largest source of public financing for investments in developing countries.34
ECA funding includes many large-scale and environmentally harmful projects
such as mining, oil drilling and pipelines, hydroelectric dams, nuclear and fossil
fuel power plants, and the sale of weapons and military equipment. Most
industrialized countries have an ECA. The ten largest ECAs belong to the G-7
countries plus the Netherlands, Sweden, and Spain.35 Countries that receive the
most ECA financing are Mexico, China, Taiwan, Turkey, Iran, Brazil, Saudi
Arabia, Venezuela, Korea, Nigeria, and the Philippines.36
As of 1998, the only ECAs that had any written environmental policies
were in the United States. 3 Yet ECAs were involved in many environmentally
damaging and controversial projects in developing countries, including most
notably India's Meheshwar Dam and China's massive Three Gorges Dam.38 As
bilateral export promotion agencies, ECAs operated in a highly competitive
atmosphere, and unilaterally adopting sustainability standards arguably could
have interfered with their export-promotion mission by presenting conditions
that made them uncompetitive with other ECAs. To overcome "the race to the
bottom," environmental CSOs looked for an international forum to champion
uniform environmental standards. 39 But at the international level, few, if any,
official pronouncements or activities linked ECAs and the environment.
Beginning in 1997 the ECA campaign sought an internationally binding set
of environmental and social norms at the ECAs. Working closely with the US
34

Bruce Rich, Trade Above All, TomPaine.com (June 5, 2001), available
<http://www.tompaine.com/Archive/scontent/4357.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

35

OECD, Export Credits and the Environment, OECD Doc TD/ECG(2004)16/FINAL, Table 1
(2004), available online at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/6/34852465.pdf> (visited Nov 17,
2007).

36

Id.

37

These ECAs were the US Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation. See Axel Bree and David Hunter, Results of a Survey of EnvironmentalProcedures at NonUS Export Credit and Risk Insurance Agencies, CIEL Working Paper (Sept 15, 1998), available online
at <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ResultsofSurveyECAs.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007). The
US Export-Import Bank created its policies in 1994 and the public Overseas Private Investment
Corporation ("OPIC") revised and publicly disclosed its policies in 1997, both after significant
CSO and Congressional pressure (and in the case of OPIC, litigation under the Freedom of
Information Act).
See Berne Declaration, et al, A Race to the Bottom: Creating RIak, Generating Debt and Guaranteeing

38

online

at

Environmental Destruction: A Compilation of Export Credit & Investment Insurance Agenfy Case Studies,
(Mar 1999), available online at <http://www.eca-watch.org/eca/racebottom.pdf> (visited Nov
17, 2007).
3

See, for example, Key Reforms Needed for European Export Credit Agencies, (Nov 2002), available
online at <http://www.eca-watch.at/forderungen/fordEU.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
(statement by 52 European CSOs calling for reforms through the OECD reform process).
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government, the campaign succeeded in several consecutive years to gain
political commitments by the G8 regarding the need for environmental
guidelines at ECAs. 40 The ECA-environment linkage was included for the first
time in the G8 Leaders' Communiqu6 from the 1997 Denver Summit:
Private sector financial flows from industrial nations have a significant
impact on sustainable development worldwide. Governments should help
promote sustainable practices by taking environmental factors into account
when providing financing support for investment in infrastructure and
equipment. We attach importance to the work on this in the OECD, and
41
will review progress at our meeting next year.
This campaign ultimately led to an agreement to negotiate at the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") a set 'of42
"common environmental guidelines, drawing on relevant MDB experience.
After several years of further negotiations, the OECD countries completed a set
of Common Approaches on the Environment and Offiiall Supported Export Credits
("Common Approaches") in 2001. 43 However, the United States, backed by
environmental CSOs, blocked consensus over the Common Approaches
because it required neither disclosure of environmental information before a
decision was made nor compliance with any identified set of standards.' The

40

41
42
43

44

See, for example, Group of Eight (G8), G8 Communiqud Ko'an 1999, 32 (June 20, 1999), available
online at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1999koln/finalcom.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
("We will work within the OECD towards common environmental guidelines for export finance
agencies. We aim to complete this work by the 2001 G8 Summit."); Group of Eight (G8), G8
Communiqu Okinawa 2000, 68 (July 23, 2000), available online at <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/
summit/2000okinawa/finalcom.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("We reaffirm our commitment to
develop common environmental guidelines, drawing on relevant MDB experience, for export
credit agencies by the 2001 G8 Summit."); Group of Eight (G8), G8 Communiqui Genoa 2001, 29
(July 22, 2001), available online at <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2001genoa/
fmalcommunique.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("We are committed to ensuring that our Export
Credit Agencies (ECAs) adhere to high environmental standards.... Building on the progress
made since last year, we commit to reach agreement in the OECD by the end of the year on a
Recommendation that fulfils the Okinawa mandate.").
Group of Eight (G8), G8 Communiqui Denver 1997, 24 (June 22, 1997), available online at
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/g8final.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See G8 Communiqui Okinawa at 68 (cited in note 40).
See Draft Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits:
Revision 6, OECD Doc TD/ECG(2000) 1/REV6.
See US General Accounting Office, Export Credit Agencies: Movement toward Common Environmental
Guidelines, but National Differences Remain, GAO-03-1093 at 2 (Sept 2003), available online at
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031093.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("The United States was
concerned that the negotiators' recommendations, formally called the Draft Recommendation on
Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits (Common
Approaches) did not level the playing field for exporters. Specifically, the US negotiators felt that
the Common Approaches granted ECAs too much latitude in establishing guidelines and did not
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remaining members of the Export Credit Group subsequently agreed to
implement the Common Approaches voluntarily.4 5
The Common Approaches were revisited in 2003, and the OECD adopted
a new Council Recommendation on environmental procedures for ECAs.46 The
2003 Council Recommendation made only minor improvements over the
original Common Approaches, but the US nonetheless agreed to it.4 1 Minor
revisions were made again in 2007. 48 Under the current OECD Common
Approaches, ECAs must screen all covered projects and ensure an
environmental review is completed for those having significant adverse
impacts.4 9 Environmental impact information must be made publicly available at
least thirty days in advance of a final commitment to a project (except for
"exceptional reasons").5" ECAs must meet host country environmental
standards and are "expected" to meet certain international standards identified
as "benchmarks" for the project." This "benchmarking" approach means that
project sponsors can identify one of a set of international standards against
which to measure the specific project's environmental performance. 2 The
project is ultimately not required to meet the international standard being used
as a benchmark, but a failure to meet the standard must be reported as part of
the annual aggregated data made available through the OECD.53
In part because of the OECD negotiations and in part because of separate
CSO national campaigns, every OECD Member Country ECA now has a
written environmental policy. In addition:

provide for sufficient public disclosure or explicit direction regarding which technical standards to
use in the review process, such as those for allowable emissions.") ("2003 GAO Repor").
45

Id at 4.

46

OECD, Recommendation on Common Approaches on Enironment and Offidaly Supported Export Credits,
OECD Doc C(2003)236 (Dec 18, 2003), as amended OECD Doc C(2004)213 (Jan 24, 2005).

47

48
49

See US Department of State, U.S. Welcomes OECD Pact on Environmental Standards,(Dec 19, 2003),
available online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2003/Dec/22-946204.html> (visited
Nov 17, 2007).
See 2007 OECD Common Approaches (cited in note 4).
Id at 7 4-11.

s0

Id at

51

Id at

52

Id at

12.

53

Id at

13.

54

OECD, Export Credits and the Environment: Responses to the RevisedoQuestionnaireon Members' Procedures
and Practices Regarding Offcialy Supported Export Credits and the Environment, OECD Doc
TD/ECG(2006)16 (Aug 9, 2006), available online at <http://webdominol.oecd.org/olis/
2006doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc1 2569fa005d004c/87ba427b34a43949c1 2571 c500543286/$FIL
E/JT03212570.PDF> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("OECDExport Credits and the Environment SurveY).

19.
12-13.
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* every OECD Member Country ECA requires some kind of initial
environmental screening, which in most cases involves at least a
questionnaire completed by the project proponent; 5
" every OECD Member Country ECA requires environmental impact
assessments ("EJAs") for most projects having a significant impact on
the environment (that is, Category A projects); 6
" twenty-four of the countries report using World Bank Group standards
among others as benchmarks for their activities; 7
" most OECD Member Countries provide more information about their
activities and twenty of them now provide environmental assessments or
other information before a decision is made; 8 and
* three OECD Member Country ECAs (the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation, Export Development Canada, and the US Overseas
Private Investment Corporation) have compliance mechanisms that can
be triggered by affected communities. 9
Although progress has been substantial, most ECA policies still do not
meet the environmental and social standards of the World Bank and other
MDBs.60

See also, for example, 2003 GAO Report at 14 (cited in note 44) (mentioning that British export
credit officials cited CSO pressure as leading to increasing environmental disclosure).
55
56

OECD, Export Creditsand the Environment at 8-10 (cited in note 54).
Id at 21-23.

57

Id at 33-35.

58

Id at 65-74.

59

The three ECAs with accountability mechanisms are (1) the Japan Bank for Investment
Cooperation's Compliance Examiners, see Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Major Rules
for Estabshment of Examiner for Environmental Guidelines, available
online
at
<http://www.jbic.go.jp/autocontents/english/news/2003/000050/major-rules.pdf>
(visited
Nov 17, 2007); (2) Export Development Canada, see Export Development Canada, Resolutions
Respecting the Compliance Officer for Export Development Canada, (Oct 24, 2001), available online at
<http://www.edc.ca/english/docs/board.resolution-e.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007); and (3) the
US Overseas Private Investment Corporation's Office of Accountability, available online at
<http://www.opic.gov/doingbusiness/accountability/> (visited Nov 17, 2007) C'OPIC Office of
Accountabiliy).

60

2003 GAO Report at 13 (cited in note 44) ("ECAs do not commonly follow the World Bank
safeguard policies on social impacts.').
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D. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES AND SUSTAINABILITY AT
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Once the MDBs and the ECAs adopted environmental policies, the
primary remaining sources of project finance lacking environmental standards
were private commercial banks. This changed in 2003, when a group of ten
leading commercial banks committed to the "Equator Principles," a set of
environmental and social standards that are linked explicitly to the IFC's
Performance Standards. 6' The Principles have now been adopted by over 40
major commercial banks, covering more than 80 percent of global project
finance.62

The Equator Principles set out an overall framework for banks to review
and to mitigate environmental and social impacts and risks. The framework was
initially based on the IFC's then-existing environmental and social safeguard
policies. Because, as noted above, the IFC subsequently replaced its policies in
2006 with new Performance Standards, the commercial banks adopted a revised
set of Equator Principles later that year to reflect the changes at the IFC.63
The centerpiece of the Equator Principles approach is its environmental
assessment requirements. Projects are classified according to the same criteria as
the IFC-as Category A, B, or C (high, medium, or low environmental or social
risk).64 For all Category A and B projects, a borrower must carry out an EIA,
which addresses the environmental and social issues identified in the
categorization process.65 The ETA must demonstrate that the project complies
with host country laws and regulations, as well as IFC's Performance Standards
and industry-specific Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines.66 For all
Category A and some Category B projects, the borrower or a third party expert
must prepare an environmental Action Plan that addresses mitigation and
monitoring of environmental and social impacts.67 For these projects, the bank
must be satisfied that the borrower has carried out a public consultation process

61

See generally <http://www.equator-principles.com>

(visited Nov 17, 2007). See also Andrew

63

Hardenbrook, Note, The Equator Principles: The Private FinancialSector's Attempt at Environmental
Responsibiliy, 40 Vand J Transntl L 197 (2007).
See Paul Watchman, Banks, Business and Human Rights, 2 Butterworths J Intl Banking & Fin L 46,
48 (Feb 2006), available online at <www.equator-principles.com/documents/IB_02.2006_
Paul%20Watchman.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See EquatorPrinciples (cited in note 5).

64

Id at Principle 1, Exh 1.

65

Id at Principle 2.

66

Id at Principle 3.

67

Id at Principle 4.

62
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among groups affected by the project.68 The terms of the plan will be
covenanted, and the bank will work with the borrower to ensure compliance.6 9
Signatories to the Equator Principles are also expected to adopt their own
internal policies, procedures, and management systems for implementing the
environmental and social policy framework.7 ° And many commercial banks have
since adopted new policies that go beyond the floor set by the Equator
Principles or the World Bank standards. For example, Rabobank's policy on
human rights, HSBC Corporation's policy on chemicals and dams, and JP
Morgan Chase's policy on forests all go beyond the corresponding policies at the
MDBs or other FIs.7
E. SUMMARY
As can be seen from the brief summaries above, the environmental and
social policy frameworks at the various categories of FIs share many common
characteristics and approaches. Central to all of them is a commitment to screen
and categorize projects according to their environmental and social impacts. The
FIs also require EIAs for projects having significant adverse environmental or
social impacts, and most require public disclosure of those assessments prior to
making any financing decision. Most also include minimum public consultation
requirements as part of the assessment process. Although important differences
exist in the details of these environmental assessment policies, they are generally
consistent.
Many of the FIs have also patterned their other environmental or social
policies to a greater or lesser extent after the safeguard policies at the World
Bank. This is particularly true of the regional MDBs. Four of the new IFC
Performance Standards also track closely the parallel safeguard policies of the
World Bank. The IFC did modify those policies to an extent to reflect their
private-sector clients and added certain topics as well. The ECA Common
Approaches and Equator Principles are too general to reflect directly the
normative framework found in either the World Bank safeguard policies or the
IFC Performance Standards, but they accomplish essentially the same outcome
indirectly either by requiring that projects be benchmarked against those

68

Id at Principle 5.

69

Id at Principle 8.

70

Id at Principle 4.

71

See Andrea Durbin, et al, Shaping the Future of Sustainable Finance: Moving from Paper Promises to
Pe formance, WWF-UK Project 2060 (an 2006), available online at <http://www.wwf.org.uk/
fielibrary/pdf/sustainablefinancereport.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (discussing and evaluating
the individual policies of more than thirty commercial banks).
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frameworks (in the case of ECAs) or by incorporating the standards by
reference (in the case of the Equator Principles).

III. CSOS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FI ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SOCIAL STANDARDS
The development of environmental and social policies at FIs, as outlined
above, has been influenced significantly by CSOs and networks that have
formed specifically to address sustainability issues at the FIs. The structure of
civil society advocacy mirrors the decentralized nature of the FIs themselves.
Horizontalnetworks of advocacy groups work for broad systemic reform at each
of the various categories of financial institutions (for example, MDBs, ECAs, or
commercial banks), while vertical networks link these international policy reform
efforts to specific on-the-ground developments and project impacts.
A. HORIZONTAL POLICY REFORM NETWORKS
Horizontal networks are those networks of national- or internationaloriented organizations that work across many countries to try to influence the
FIs at the international policy level. These networks have significant access to
the institutions, to information, to the media, and to key policymakers. They
work in coordinated efforts to make systemic changes at the FIs. These
horizontal networks are typically permanent networks with a core group of
national and international organizations that are committed over the long term
to cooperate in the monitoring and reform of the targeted financial institutions.
Separate horizontal networks exist for each targeted financial institution or
group of institutions. Thus, for example, the World Bank reform campaign
involves core groups in each of the large donor (G7) countries as well as in
several key borrowing countries. Similarly, horizontal networks exist for
reforming the Asian Development Bank,12 the Inter-American Development
Bank, 73 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 74 the
European Investment Bank,75 export credit agencies,76 and commercial banks.7

72

See generally NGO Forum on the ADB, available online at <http://www.forum-adb.org/>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).

73

For a list of organizations monitoring World Bank, IMF, and other IF projects in Latin America,
see the Bank Information Center website, available online at <http://www.bicusa.org/en/
Region.Parrners.4.aspx> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

74

See EBRD-CEE Bankwatch Network, available
project.shtml?w=147579> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

75

See EIB-CEE Bankwatch Network, available
project.shrml v=147578> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

online at <http://www.bankwatch.org/
online

at

<http://www.bankwatch.org/

Vol. 8 No. 2

Civil Sodety Networks and the Development of EnvironmentalStandards

Hunter

Often one organization takes the primary role for coordinating the
network. For example, the most important coordinating organization for reform
of MDBs is the Bank Information Center ("BIC"), which opened in
Washington, DC in 1987 and now has offices in India, the Philippines, and
Peru.78 BIC acts as an embassy for CSOs, affected communities, and grassroots
movements working to reform the MDBs or to mitigate negative impacts of
MDB lending. For its civil society constituents, BIC is a principal source of
information and offers access to decisionmakers, and strategic and advocacy
support. The network of groups pushing for MDB reforms has now grown
from four or five US and European environmental groups to a network that
includes dozens of active organizations from each of the G7 countries and many
other countries in Europe and the Global South, including some of the largest
borrowing countries. 79 The priorities for MDB reform have shifted from
environmental issues to human rights, social equity, corruption, and
development effectiveness. Largely because of the role that the BIC plays, the
global effort to promote MDB reform works closely together with shared
priorities, a high degree of coordination, and excellent information flow.
Horizontal international networks also exist for the reform of ECAs and
commercial banks. Because the FIs targeted by these reform efforts are not
multilateral, however, CSO activities also include national campaigns focused on
specific financial institutions. The International Campaign to Reform ECAs,
launched in 1997, now targets ECA reform through fifteen separate national
campaigns and essentially two international campaigns directed at the OECD's

76

ECAWatch: International NGO Campaign on Export Credit Agencies, available online at
<http://www.eca-watch.org/> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

77

BankTrack, available online at <www.banktrack.org> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See Bank Information Center, available online at <http://www.bicusa.org> (visited Nov 17,
2007). This discussion of the civil society reform networks does not describe all of the CSO
interactions with the Bank. Many service CSOs work with the World Bank and other
development banks to implement projects. See Jane G. Covey, Is Critical Cooperation Possible?
Influencing the World Bank through OperationalCollaboration and Poig Dialogue, in Fox and Brown, eds,
The Struggle for Accountabilio at 81 (cited in note 8). Other CSOs engage primarily in cooperative
policy dialogues or working groups with the Bank. See Steve Herz and Alnoor Ebrahim, A Cailfor
Participatogy Decision-Making: Discussion Paper on World Bank-Civil Sociey Engagement 13-15 (June
2005),
available
online
at
<www.civicus.org/new/media/World-Bank-Civil-SocietyDiscussionPaperFINALVERSION.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (categorizing World Bank
reform groups into "principled non-engagers," "selective engagers," and "collaborative
engagers").

78

79

See What is IFIWatchnet?, available online at <http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/?q=en/node/6>
(visited Nov 17, 2007) ('With nearly 60 organisations from 27 different countries in every region
of the world.").
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Export Credit Group and decisionmakers at the EU level. 80 The international
campaign is broad-based, encompassing environmental protection, transparency,
human rights, debt, corruption, military expenditures, and other social goals
relating to sustainable development. The Campaign's specific goals for reform
81
are endorsed by more than 350 organizations from over 50 countries.
ECA reform activities are thus not, strictly speaking, a "global
campaign"-a term that sets up the wrong expectations and aspirations as
applied to ECAs. A global campaign suggests unified strategies, goals, targets,
and a global governance structure with shared participation from all regions. In
reality, however, each of the national campaigns necessarily reflects different
priorities and tactics. In addition, the two international venues for ECA
reform-the OECD and the EU-are not global, having only industrialized
developed countries in their membership. The ECA reform campaign is thus
more accurately understood as a decentralized web of regional, bilateral, and
project-specific relationships that share a common interest in reducing the
environmental and social impacts of ECAs. The relationship between donorcountry and recipient-country CSOs is less one of shared governance and
leadership in a common campaign than of information sharing, collaborative
research, and mutual support for project-specific activism.
B. VERTICAL NETWORKS AND PROJECT-BASED CAMPAIGNING
Unlike the typically permanent, policy reform-oriented, horizontal
networks described above, vertical networks form and reform around specific
projects or case studies.82 These vertical networks, composed of international,
national, and community-based CSOs, enable the flow of on-the-ground
experience and information "up" to the international level, driving changes in
specific projects and broader policy changes. Thus, depending on the nature of
the financial arrangements in a project, a vertical network will form to campaign
for improvements in the project. At the same time, information about the FIs,
access to FT decisionmakers, and policy expertise flow "down" to the national
80

For general information about the International Campaign to Reform Export Credit Agencies, see
ECAWatch: International NGO Campaign on Export Credit Agencies (cited in note 76).

81

Jakarta Declarationfor the Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment InsuranceAgencies, (May 2000),
available online at <http://www.eca-watch.org/goals/jakartadec.html> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

82

See, for example, Margaret E. Keck, Planafloro in Rondonia: The Limits of Leverage, in Fox and
Brown, eds, The Struggle for Accountabiliy 181, 207 (cited in note 8) (noting that the "localinternational linkages around this project appeared to be among the most effective-if not the
most effective-of any in the transnational CSO networks monitoring Bank activities"); Philip
Shabecoff, World Bank Offers Environmental Projects, NY Times A14 (May 6, 1987) (reporting on
World Bank President Barber Conable's announcement of major restructuring of the Bank's
environmental approach at least partly in response to the Polonoroeste project).
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and community levels. A form of "partnership advocacy" begins with the
network mobilized to raise the issues of the specific project, not only to improve
the project but also to drive broader policy change at the institution. 3 The
vertical networks are transitory-forming, dissolving, and reforming--as
decisions are reached over specific projects and as new controversial projects
emerge.
Vertical networks work in an integrated way. National-level CSOs act as a
bridge between the community-based CSOs that are focused on improving
specific projects and international CSOs that are seeking broader policy reform.
This bridging function is critical for the effective success of reform efforts. The
local experiences allow international campaigners to leverage lessons learned by
their partners on the ground into policy reforms at the FIs. Most major
environmental and social reforms at FIs can often be traced back to mistakes or
weaknesses in their approaches to specific controversial projects.84 Moreover,
many of the reforms pushed by the international organizations are aimed at
empowering the role of project-affected people on the ground. Thus,
international reform campaigns emphasize rights of access to information,
public participation and consultation, and public accountability."5 This reflects an
overall "bottom-up" view of social change for these institutions. In addition,
close connections to project-affected people through a strong vertical network
often provide critical validation and legitimacy for international organizations.
The international CSOs' role in amplifying the voice of project-affected people
is in fact one of the primary justifications for international CSO participation in
F1 policymaking in the first place.86

83

84

85

86

For a discussion of this partnership advocacy and its use of case studies, see David Wirth,
PartnershipAdvocay in World Bank Reform, in Fox and Brown, eds, The Struggle for Accountahiiy 51
(cited in note 8).
See, for example, IFC, Lessons Learned: Pangue HydroelectricProjectat 2 (cited in note 21).
Unknown to many, it was the Pangue project that catalyzed the strengthening
of IFC's institutional capacity to address environmental and social issues, most
notably the emergence of IFC's Environment and Social Development
Department; the adoption of the Safeguard Policies; the formulation of robust
environmental and social project review procedures; and the establishment of
the CAO's Office.
See, for example, GTI, What is the GTY?, available online at <http://ifitransparency.org/
about.shtml> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (describing the Global Transparency Initiative as "a network
of civil society organisations promoting openness" in FIs); Lori Udall, The World Bank and Puhlic
Accountahihfy: Has Anything Changed?, in Fox and Brown, eds, The Struggle for Accountability at 391
(cited in note 8) (recounting changes in information disclosure, participation, and accountability at
the World Bank).
Other reasons set forth to justify the place of international CSOs in debates around MDBs and
other financial institutions include their roles as taxpayers supporting the organizations and,
perhaps most importantly, their expertise on issues of environmental and social sustainability.
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Of course several tensions persist within the CSO network operations.
One is the tension between groups who want to shut down the FIs, particularly
public institutions such as the World Bank; those who want to reform them; and
those who actually want to expand Bank lending in certain areas seen as more
sustainable.8 7 Holding these groups together in a coalition promoting a set of
specific policy reforms is often one of the most difficult roles for campaign
leaders. Another recurrent tension is between local or smaller groups with
project-specific goals and the international groups who are hoping to make
broader systemic change. Tensions can arise not only from the temptation to
compromise one set of gains for the other, but also in setting overall priorities
for the campaign. For example, for CSOs from the donor countries (US,
Canada, Europe, and Japan) working on ECA reform, ECAs are the targets of
their campaigns, so ECA reform is an end in itself. Advocates in recipient
countries are likely to see ECAs as one target in their campaigns that are
generally seeking to influence a specific project that may have multiple
financiers.88 Recipient-country activists seek both more information earlier about
the financing of projects in their countries and more efficient mechanisms for
linking to international ECA campaigns on specific projects. These types of
issues are far more salient for recipient-country activists than an international
campaign around more technical policy changes.
C. THE ROLES OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS

Through these interconnected networks working both horizontally and
vertically, CSOs have had a major impact on the development of sustainable
finance standards. The CSO networks have played several important roles,
See, for example, David Wirth, PartnershipAdvocay in World Bank Reform, in Fox and Brown, eds,
The Strugglefor Accountabilio at 51, 59 (cited in note 8) (describing World Bank advocacy groups as
"reformists" and "abolitionists"); Herz and Ebrahim, A Callfor ParidpatoyDecision-Making at 1315 (cited in note 78). Compare the network platform of the 50 Years Is Enough Campaign,
available online at <http://www.50years.org/about/> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (calling "for the
immediate suspension of the policies and practices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank Group which have caused widespread poverty, inequality, and suffering among the
world's peoples and damage to the world's environment') with the goal of the Global
Transparency Initiative in What is the GTI? (cited in note 85) (stating that GTI "aims to strengthen
IFIs' accountability to the public interest and to expand political space to debate development
models.... The GTI aims to impact positively on this process [towards greater openness] and to
contribute constructively to the debate about how the 'right to know' can be implemented by the
IFIs").
88 See, for example, Center for Environment and Human Rights, Paper Pulp Mills-Uruguay,
available online at <http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiaves/paper-pulp-mills/> (visited Nov
17, 2007) (listing the variety of actions taken by opponents to two Uruguayan pulp mills, including
challenges to financial support from export credit agencies, IFC, and commercial banks, as well as
other challenges).
87
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including placing and maintaining environmental and social issues on the policy
agendas of the FIs; cross-fertilizing information about environmental and social
standards in a process of upward harmonization; and monitoring
implementation of, and compliance with, the standards. These various roles are
discussed further below.
1. Agenda Setting
Motivated and informed by the environmental and social impacts of
specific projects, CSOs are often the first entities to bring environmental and
social concerns to the attention of the respective FIs. They often maintain this
"agenda-setting" role over time, by raising new issues or seeking stronger
standards as new projects reveal new concerns. The CSOs essentially set the
environmental and social policy agenda of the FIs. CSO concerns over impacts
on indigenous rights and the environment in Brazil, and internally displaced
refugees in Narmada, for example, led more or less directly to reforms in World
Bank policies relating to environmental assessment, resettlement, and indigenous
peoples.89 CSOs were the first to call for transparency and accountability reforms
at the Bank and other Fls as well.
The agenda-setting role is also clear with respect to ECAs. In the wake of
environmental concerns, MDB financing waned for some particularly
controversial projects, most notably China's Three Gorges Dam, 90 but this was
not the case for ECA or private sector financing.91 CSOs' attention in turn
moved and they brought their sustainability agendas to those institutions. To try
to reform ECA lending, CSOs, with support from the US government, brought
environmental and social issues, including corruption and more recently human
rights concerns, to national and international fora, such as the OECD and the
G8. Although still incomplete, the CSOs successfully placed sustainability
concerns firmly and permanently on most ECAs' agendas.9 2

90

See, for example, Shabecoff, World Bank Offers Environmental Projects, NY Times at A14 (cited in
note 9) (reporting on World Bank President Barber Conable's announcement of major reforms at
the Bank in which he cites problems with Brazil's Polonoroeste project).
See Questioning Three Gorges Dam, NY Times A20 (Mar 29, 1999) (noting that both the World Bank

91

and US Export Import Bank refused financing); Margaret Barber and Grainne Ryder, Damming the
Three Gorges: What Dam Builders Don't Want You to Know 22 (Earthscan 2d ed 1993) (noting that the
World Bank and Asian Development Bank would not finance due to environmentalist pressure).
See Bern Declaration, et al, Race to the Bottom at 7-8 (cited in note 38).

89

92

At the time that the NGO campaign to reform ECAs was launched in 1997, only the US ECAs
had any environmental policies. See Bree and Hunter, Survey of Environmental Procedures (cited in
note 37). Within approximately five years, ECAs from OECD member countries had made
substantial advances in their environmental policies. See notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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The agenda-creating aspect of CSO work is a bit less clear in the case of
private commercial banks. Multiple motivations undoubtedly contributed to the
decisions of the commercial banks to negotiate the Equator Principles. Some
banks were at least partly responding to pressure from environmental activist
organizations that had targeted their roles in the destruction of the Amazon and
other environmental impacts. In particular, Rainforest Action Network's
campaign against Citibank appeared to highlight to the entire financial sector
how failing to address the environmental and social impacts of their operations
could damage their reputation. 3 But other forces were at work as well. The IFC
was actively supporting and promoting the adoption of its standards to private
sector lenders. The IFC sought to be the leader in sustainable finance and did
not want to be harmed competitively by the lack of policies in the private sector.
Some commercial banks also independently saw environmental and social
sustainability as a competitive niche.
2. Upward Harmonization and Cross-Fertilization
As CSOs shift their attention from one set of FIs to another, they bring
with them the experience and knowledge of what exists at other FIs. Often,
CSOs present policy options to FIs in the context of comparative assessments
with the policies of similar FIs. 4 Thus, a policy gain at the World Bank, for
example, is carried over and becomes a new reform proposal at other FIs. CSOs
use existing standards at one F1 as a floor in their lobbying of other FIs,
recognizing that no FI likes to be portrayed as a laggard.
The horizontal networks are critical for disseminating the lessons learned
across FIs. These networks coordinate closely with one another, and many

93

See
Rainforest
Action
Network,
Global Finance Campaign, available
<http://ran.org/what-we-do/global-finance/faqO/> (visited Nov 17, 2007).

94

See, for example, NGO Gaps Anaysis: Examples of Stronger Environmental and Social Standards than
IFC's Proposed Pe~formance Standards, available online at <http://www.grrr-now.org/doc/
NGO%2OGaps%20Analysis.doc> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (prepared in 2005 as part of the CSO
critique of the IFC's proposed environmental and social performance standards); Durbin, et al,
Shaping the Future of Sustainable Finance (cited in note 71) (comparing individual policies of
commercial banks against other standards, including Fl standards); Tom Griffiths, A Failure of
Accountabiliy: Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights, and Development Ageng Standards:A Reference Tool and
Comparative Review
(Forest
Peoples
Programme
2003),
available
online
at
<http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/law hr/ipdevt_stds_failureaccountability-dec03_
eng.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (reviewing the indigenous peoples policies of twenty-seven
multilateral and bilateral financial institutions); Bank Information Center and freedominfo.org, A
ComparativeAnaysis and Introduction to the IFI Transparengy Resource: Opening the InternationalFinancial
Institutions, (Feb 7, 2005), available online at <http://www.ifitransparencyresource.org/
documentupload/Comparative.Analysis.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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organizations are active members in all of the major sustainable finance efforts. 95
The networks also meet occasionally and support shared listservs and websites
to coordinate strategies and to share information.96 As a result, many of the same
policy reforms are championed across the sustainable finance networks.
Moreover, a major tactic of these networks is to publicize changes in the policies
of one institution to create upward harmonization pressure on other institutions.
In this way, advances in environmental and social standards are promoted
externally to other institutions.
This is particularly true with the adoption of standards by the World Bank
Group. For better or worse, the World Bank Group is the recognized standardsetter in development finance and investment. The OECD Common
Approaches list the World Bank Group policies among those against which
ECAs are expected to benchmark their own performance, and individual ECAs
frequently adopt World Bank standards as their own benchmarks.97 Moreover, as
mentioned above, the commercial banks signing on to the Equator Principles
have essentially agreed to follow the environmental policies of IFC when
operating in developing countries. Reform CSOs recognize this situation and
frequently seek to expedite the exportation of the World Bank Group standards
as a floor from which to begin negotiations at other institutions. In this way,
some (frequently minor) improvements can be achieved.98
This harmonization strategy is not always successful, of course, particularly
because various FIs argue that they are unique or at least different in important
ways. ECAs, for example, are not "development" agencies and arguably do not
need to consider environmental and social issues in the same way as the
MDBs.99 Also, as bilateral agencies, ECAs are arguably already covered by a
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In the United States, for example, Environmental Defense, Pacific Environment, Friends of the
Earth, World Wildlife Fund, and the CIEL participate actively in the separate networks to reform
all FIs, including MDBs, ECAs, and private banks. Similarly, in Europe, Corner House (UK),
Amis de la Terre (France), Urgewald (Germany), and Campagna per la Riforma della Banca
Mondiale (Italy) actively participate in all sustainable finance reform networks.
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See, for example, Global Rights, Rules and Responsibilities, available online at <http://www.grrrnow.org> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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See, for example, 2007 OECD Common Approaches at
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12 (cited in note 4).
For example, the revised Asian Development Bank Accountability Function consciously made
several improvements over the World Bank Inspection Panel. Eisuke Suzuki and Suresh
Nanwani, Responsibiliy of International Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral
Development Banks, 27 Mich J Intl L 177 (2005); Asian Development Bank, Review of the Inspection
Function: Establishment of a New ADB Accountabilioy Mechanism, (May 2003), available online at
<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Poicies/ADB Accountabihty-Mechanism/ADB
accountability-mechanism.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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The primary mission of most ECAs is to promote the exports of the ECA's home country, not to
promote development in the country hosting the project.
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normative framework found in their home countries' laws (although, except in
the US, the national ECA laws did not initially cover environmental impacts of
their financing activities abroad). Because of the private sector nature of their
clients, IFC and the Equator Banks, in turn, are different than the World Bank
(that is, IBRD and IDA).
The net result of this dialogue was often debates around the precise terms
of the standards as applied to the various FIs. In the end, the normative
frameworks look strikingly similar, but with important exceptions or changes.
For example, the ECA Common Approaches only apply to projects where the
ECA's share is over 10 million Special Drawing Rights, and they only require 30day disclosure of environmental assessments.'00 The World Bank and the other
MDBs require 120-day disclosure.'
Although this process has resulted in surprising harmonization, it has also
come with a loss of creativity and experimentalism that might otherwise have
occurred at the FIs. Just as pressure can be built to get other FIs to adopt at least
the same environmental and social standards as the World Bank, resistance can
also emerge for standards to go no further than the Bank's standards. In this
regard, a floor at times is indistinguishable from a ceiling. This may be most
striking with respect to FIs' relative lack of attention to human rights. The
World Bank has long hesitated to incorporate human rights language explicitly
into its policies because human rights are believed to be too political and thus
outside the factors the Bank should consider in making loans. 0 2 Given the
predominant role the World Bank policies play in sustainable finance standards,
this failure to reflect human rights language is also reflected throughout other FI
policies.0 3
100 2007 OECD Common Approaches at

5,19 (cited in note 4).

101 This 120-day disclosure is viewed as critical by many CSOs in order to give local communities
enough time to evaluate and respond to the impacts identified in the project assessments. It also
formed the basis of US legislation aimed at ensuring this requirement at the MDBs. See 22 USC
§ 262m-7 (2000) (as created by § 521 ("Assessment of Environmental Impact of Proposed
Multilateral Development Bank Actions") of International Development and Finance Act of
1989, Pub L No 101-240, 103 Stat 2492 (1989)).
102
Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Anaysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of
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Achievements, 17 DenverJ Ind L39, 40 (1988).
Human rights are not provided general protection in any of the regional development bank
policies, the OECD Common Approaches, nor the Equator Principles. Despite significant
pressure from CSOs, the IFC's environmental and social policies make only minor references to
human rights. For example, the IFC's Policy on Social and Environmental Responsibility only
"recognizes that the roles and responsibilities of the private sector in respecting human rights are
emerging as an important aspect of corporate social responsibility." It makes no firm
commitments. See InternationalFinance Corporation'sPoligy on Environmental and Social Sustainabilily,
8 (Apr 30, 2006), available online at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTide/
polSocEnvSustainability2006/$FILE/SustainabiityPolicy.pdf>
(visited Nov 17,
2007).
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3. Monitoring and Implementation
CSOs also play a critically important monitoring and implementation role.
Because of the verticality of their networks, CSOs offer an independent channel
of information from the project level to top levels of F1 decisionmaking.
Because of well-recognized internal incentives to lend money, FT project staff
frequently view environmental and social concerns as impediments to their
development role. 1' The net result is somewhat frequent examples of F1 project
staff downplaying or ignoring significant environmental and social concerns
during project preparation. Directors and top managers of FIs thus risk
receiving only the good news and may be insulated from negative consequences
of their lending activities. 10 5 Moreover, once a project has been approved by the
Bank, most attention is turned to preparing other new loans. The World Bank
has had difficulty emphasizing the importance of implementation over the life of
the project. 10 6
CSO networks that successfully bring timely information and experiences
from the project level play a critical role in focusing international attention on
the ground, where the implementation of F1 sustainability commitments is
meant to improve the projects' development impacts. CSOs frequently shape
their concerns over project-level impacts in terms of policy violations because
this can place the debate on technical grounds and sometimes gain allies who
would otherwise not engage in a political discussion (for example, environmental
and social staff in the FIs). CSOs raise these noncompliance concerns through
letters to F1 directors or technical staff, briefings with external policymakers
such as Parliamentarians or opinion-makers such as journalists, and sometimes,
by bringing complaints of noncompliance to accountability mechanisms such as
the World Bank Inspection Panel or IFC's Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman.' 7
CSOs' attention to compliance also means that they are paying attention to the
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Although the FIs do not adopt human rights generally, F1 policies such as those on involuntary
resettlement and indigenous peoples are protective of some human rights.
See, for example, Willi Wapenhans, et al, Report of the Portfolio Management Task Force--Effective
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Implementation: Ky to Development Impact 33-35 (World Bank 1992).
See, for example, Caufield, Masters of Illusion at 175-76 (cited in note 8) (noting that executive
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directors knew nothing of environmental staff concerns on Brazil's Polonoroeste project when
they voted to approve the project); Hair, et al, Pangue Hydroelectric Project: An Independent Review
(cited in note 21).
As evidence of this, note that in the first ten years of its operations more than half of all claims to
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the World Bank Inspection Panel related at least partly to alleged violations of the Bank's policies
on project monitoring, evaluation, and supervision. See World Bank Inspection Panel,
Accountabiliy at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On 131-33, Annex VI-C (World Bank
2003) (seventeen of twenty-seven claims alleged violations of project monitoring or supervision
policies).
For further discussion of Fl accountability mechanisms, see Section IV.D.
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internal compliance monitoring activities of the FIs. This can lead both0 8to
supporting internal monitoring activities and highlighting their shortcomings.'
From the project-level perspective, the strategic decision to focus advocacy
on the international sources of financing "internationalizes" what would
otherwise be local campaigns to prevent or improve project-level impacts. This
internationalization lifts the type and location of argument out of the national or
subnational policy arenas to the international stage. Although CSOs working at
the local level may benefit from the added publicity and prestige that they
receive from taking the case international, it may do little to improve the longterm political space for local participation or policy dialogue that may be
important for long-term gains at the project level.'O° Ensuring that reference to
international standards and fora does not supplant or undermine local
governance structures is an important consideration and a source of potential
tension in international CSO reform efforts.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
Having described the development of the environmental and social
standards at FIs and the CSO networks that promote these polices, we can now
reflect on the implications of these developments for international
environmental law. The following Sections discuss both process-oriented as well
as substantive reflections.
A. NETWORKING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY
The development of epistemic communities (that is, communities of
technical experts that share common goals and expertise) around multilateral
environmental treaty regimes is now widely recognized as both an important
positive outcome from those regimes and as an integral component of the
regimes' relative effectiveness." 0 The development of environmental and social
standards for international finance has been accompanied by the emergence of
an epistemic community committed to the creation and implementation of these
standards. Like the epistemic communities in multilateral environmental treaty
regimes, the F1 technical community includes CSO representatives as well as

108

See, for example, BankTrack (cited in note 77).
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See, for example, Keck, Planafloro in Rondonia at 181-213 (cited in note 82) (arguing that success at
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the international level was not mirrored with success in building local civil society influence).
See, for example, Peter Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution
Control,43 Ind Org 377 (1989); Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learnedin GlobalEnvironmental Governance, 18
BC Envir AffL Rev 213, 265-66 (1991).
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representatives from the financial institutions, national government officials, and
in some cases industry organizations. These technical experts share common
knowledge, experiences, and a commitment to sustainable finance.
Several differences exist, however, between the epistemic community of
technical experts around FIs and that surrounding the typical multilateral
environmental treaty regime. First, the sustainable finance epistemic community
is decentralized. No formal treaty establishes a centralized regime where
governments can predictably set the broad parameters, timing, and agenda of the
debate within which the epistemic community operates. For the environmental
campaigners involved with FIs, the presence of numerous targets means that the
epistemic community is also decentralized and fragmented, with less opportunity
for coordinated efforts around major predictable events."' To be sure,
significant meeting venues exist, but none of them are critical overall. Probably
the most important is the annual meeting of the World Bank, but that event has
only marginally more value for pushing reforms than meetings the reformers
arrange at the Bank throughout the year. Other venues include the annual
meetings of other MDBs, the World Economic Summit in Davos, the World
Social Summit, annual G8 meetings, and the annual meetings of the Equator
Principle banks. Although each of these may provide an opportunity for the
sustainable finance community to meet, share ideas, and promote reforms, none
of them is predictably central to the community. This decentralized nature and
the fact that no state-organized event is critical to the epistemic community's
creation or growth, means that CSOs can set agendas in response to specific
project or policy priorities and timelines.
A second feature of the sustainable finance epistemic community is that
CSOs essentially created the community. Not only did the calls for sustainable
finance come most loudly from CSOs, but they were directed at institutions,
mostly banks, that had little or no expertise in environmental and social
considerations. As late as 1997, for example, the IFC had only 2 environmental
specialists; a decade later they are approaching nearly 200. Moreover, at the
national level, the agencies overseeing finance (central banks or finance and
treasury ministries) had little environmental or social expertise. CSOs recognized
early that they needed people who understood the environmental issues within
the institutions that were being targeted for reform. Thus, for example,
environmental groups supported the addition of environmental positions at the
US Treasury and MDBs and the creation of a Vice Presidency for
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Contrast this with the development of epistemic communities in international environmental
treatv regimes. There, annual or biannual meetings of the parties become major events with
hundreds or thousands of people sharing information and expertise.
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Environmental and Social Development at the World Bank in 1987.12 The CSO
reformers then sought regular meetings with these technical experts within the
institutions, sharing information, exchanging views, and building trust. 3
A final feature of the epistemic community is that private-sector experts
have played a relatively limited role in some of the most important parts of the
debate. For example, because the creation of environmental and social standards
at the World Bank applied primarily to public-sector infrastructure projects with
governments as the borrowers, the private sector did not follow the emergence
of the World Bank's environmental and social standards closely. It was only as
those standards were adopted by institutions with private sector clients-most
notably the IFC and the commercial banks-that private sector representatives
became active in the debates. To the private sector, the costs of following a
decentralized and continual policy dialogue on general standards were not worth
the expense, particularly given that trade associations (which often carry out the
private sector's lobbying activities) are typically organized around industry
sectors and had limited motivation to engage in the general debates. Although to
some extent this has allowed CSO experts to play a more dominant role, it has
also meant that the FIs acted as the intermediary voice for the private sector,
sometimes limiting the richness of the dialogue.
B. THE ROLE OF STATES

As implied above, states have had a limited direct role in the development
and adoption of these sustainable finance standards. With no overarching
sustainable finance treaty, the states' role in creating sustainable finance
standards has had to arise in ways other than treatymaking.
First, international organizations like the World Bank Group and the other
MIDBs are created by states, and states occupy and control the top
decisionmaking organs of these FIs. Thus, through the Board of Governors and
Board of Executive Directors, states do exercise ultimate authority over MDB
operations. This authority reaches to the sustainable finance standards, as most
of the environmental and social policies at the MDBs are now endorsed at the
board level." 4 Through this process, states have influenced the outcome of the
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See, for example, Ian A. Bowles and Cyril F. Kormos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The
Role of the US Congress, 35 Va J Intl L 777, 786-88 (1995); Shabecoff, World Bank Offers
Environmental Projects,NY Times at A14 (cited in note 9).
For example, the US bank reform community meets the first Tuesday of every month with
officials in the US government with oversight roles in the environmental or social impacts of IFI
lending.
See, for example, IFC, New 1FC Sustainability Poliy, Performance Standards, Disclosure Poliy Now in
Force, Consultation Advisory No 14 (Apr 30, 2006), available online at <http://www.ifc.org/
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norms significantly, but the process is not typically a state-to-state negotiation
like one might find in treaty regimes. Rather, it is a technical exercise between
interested states and the environmental and social professionals of the MDBs.
Interested governments will typically comment on potential policy changes
during the draft stage and will work with the technical staff to effect changes
before the policies come to the board for a vote. Rarely does this dialogue with
the professional staff erupt into a state-to-state dialogue, primarily because the
standards are too technical for negotiation by the Executive Directors (who for
the most part do not have environmental backgrounds).
Behind this role of the states is an important relationship with civil society
environmental and social experts. Most of the MDB executive directors do not
have the expertise to participate in the technical review of these standards. They
rely on assistance from the home office (for example, the Department of
Treasury in the United States), and even then most states do not devote
significant resources to engaging in the development of environmental standards
that, at least in the case of the donor countries, will have no impact within their
own countries. When governments do get engaged it is usually because issues
have been brought to their attention by the CSOs. This is done through
briefings at the executive director's office,
meetings with the finance ministries,
15
or Parliamentary oversight processes.'
In this context, although individual states cannot dictate outcomes to the
MDBs, the influence of individual states can be magnified if they are willing to
put resources into tracking a specific issue. CSOs' strategies have frequently
included building domestic pressure to get their governments to use their votes
at the executive director level to influence the MDB's environmental policies. A
clear example of this is US legislation known as the Pelosi Amendment, which
requires the Secretary of Treasury to instruct the US executive directors at every
MDB to vote against or to abstain on any project having significant
environmental impact if no environmental assessment has been made publicly
available at least 120 days before the vote." 6 The Pelosi Amendment seeks to
ensure that both the public and the Bank's voting officials have access to critical
environmental information before irreversible decisions are made, yet it also
recognizes that the US Congress can not directly tell a multilateral institution
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ifcext/poicyreview.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/IFC+Consultation+Advisory+No.1 4/$FILE/IFC+
Consultation+Advisory+No+14.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (noting the Board of the IDC
approved these policies).
See, for example, Hearing on Authorizing Contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF before the
House Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 103d Congress,
1st Sess (1993). See also Bowles and Kormos, 35 VaJ Intl L 777 (cited in note 112).
22 USC § 262m-7(a)(1).
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what to do. Instead, the Congress restricts the discretion of US officials
overseeing the MDBs. Since the Pelosi Amendment became effective in 1991,
the respective US directors no longer vote for any project significantly affecting
the environment unless the necessary environmental information has been
released. In response, the World Bank and most of the regional MDBs rewrote
their policies to ensure that environmental assessments are made publicly
available at least 120 days in advance." 7
Although individual states do not have direct control over the policies of
international FIs, that is not the case with respect to ECAs. As organs created by
individual governments, those states can control the environmental and social
policies of the ECAs who act as their agents. Enacting environmental and social
standards at ECAs is a national regulatory act, requiring no international
lawmaking role at all. As noted above, the US adopted environmental and social
standards for their ECAs relatively early but other countries were slow to follow.
Even with pressure from the US government and often their own civil society
organizations, the other ECAs resisted adopting environmental and social
policies for nearly a decade-often citing concerns over competitiveness vis-avis other ECAs.
Because of these competitiveness concerns, ECA policies in other contexts
had been coordinated through the Trade Division of the OECD. For this
reason, negotiation of the ECAs' environmental and social policies eventually
took place at the OECD, where traditional state-to-state negotiations ultimately
resulted in the OECD Common Approaches.
Interestingly, the relative weakness of the Common Approaches arguably
reveals the inherent shortcoming of state-centered and negotiated lawmaking
efforts. Consensus on clear standards proved difficult, so the states resorted to
the least common denominator-an agreement to use standards as nonbinding
benchmarks against which to measure ECA performance as opposed to setting
binding minimum standards for all ECAs."8
Although states arguably played a significant role in approving
environmental and social standards at public FIs, states have had little control
over the dissemination, incorporation, and application of the standards once
they are adopted. By being spread from one F1 to another, these norms are more
than internal institutional benchmarks; they are part of an international normsetting dynamic that is largely beyond the control of states or of any specific FI.
Certainly, the donor governments and the institutions themselves have
117
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Development Banks: Impact of the PelosiAmendment (Cong Research Set 1997); Bowles and Kormos,
35 VaJ Intl L 777 (cited in note 112).
118 See notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing the OECD Common Approaches).
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recognized the value of harmonization across multilateral financial institutions," 9
but, as discussed above, CSOs have served as critical disseminators of these
standards across institutions. Note that the Equator Principles largely
incorporated the state-approved standards of the IFC, thus considerably
expanding the scope of the IFC Directors' decision to approve the Performance
Standards. Thus, the IFC's normative framework has reached well beyond the
contours of its own institution and has set conditions-that is, legal norms-for
project finance in many other contexts. The spread of the IFC's normative
framework has occurred with little endorsement of nation-states.
Although in initially approving environmental and social standards at the
IFC and other MDBs, states were formally creating operational policies and
norms that would only govern the specific F1 in question. They may not have
recognized the extent to which external forces (for example, the harmonization
strategies of CSOs and the FIs themselves) would spread these normative
decisions to broader contexts.
C. SUSTAINABLE FINANCE STANDARDS AS

INTERNATIONAL LAW
To some extent the environmental and social standards of the World Bank
are simply analogous to regulatory rules of national-level administrative agencies.
They are thus the regulatory product of what is becoming known as global
administrative law.1 20 Others have discussed norms emerging from UN agencies
as part of a "universal" international law'21 or have cited them as evidence of
customary law.

122

119 See, for example, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results,

and Mutual Accountabiliy,
40-42 (Feb 28-Mar 2, 2005), available online at
<http://wwwl .worldbank.org/harrnonization/Paris/FINALPARISDECLARATION.pdf>
(visited Nov 17, 2007); Working Group on the Environment of Multilateral Financial Institutions,
A Common Framework: Converging Requirements of MultilateralFinancialInstitutions:Environmental Impact
Assessment, (an 17, 2003), available online at <http://wwwl.worldbank.org/harmonization/
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romehlf/Background/MFI%/o20Final%20Jai n17%/202003-Eng.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007);
International Finance Corporation, External Training on IFC'sNew Performance Standardson Social and
Environmental Sustainabilioy, available online at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/
EnvSocStandardsTraining> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (describing IFC's efforts to train Equator
Principle banks in the application of IFC's Performance Standards).
See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart, The Emergence of GlobalAdministrative
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Law, 68 L & Contemp Probs 15 (2005).
See Jonathan Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw,87 Am J Intl L 529, 543-48 (1993).
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See Case Concerning the Gabdkovo-Nagmams Project (Hung v Slov), 1997 ICJ 92 n 4 (Sept 25, 1997)
(separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry) (citing the World Bank's and other FIs'
support for the principle of sustainable development as partial support for arguing that it is
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In light of the independent value of sustainable finance standards, the
question of whether they are international law may not be that critical. More
important for international environmental law may be how these standards
contribute to or reinforce the development of international environmental law.
The World Bank has stated it will not finance projects that contravene any
international environmental agreement to which the Member Country
concerned is a party. 123 Some specific international norms found in multilateral
environmental agreements are also clearly adopted and incorporated into the
sustainable finance standards. For example, most of the institutions ban
investments in CFCs phased out under the Montreal Protocol regime and
persistent organic pollutants ("POPs") banned under the Stockholm POPs
Convention, and reject projects that will harm cultural heritage sites protected
124
under the World Heritage Convention.
Yet the MDBs could do better and have never systematically agreed to
follow international law, particularly with respect to human rights. 125 One of the
critiques of the IFC's new performance standards, for example, was their failure
to reflect the normative standards of other international legal processes,
including multilateral environmental agreements, human rights instruments, and
international labor standards. 126 Efforts to get the IFC to incorporate
international legal norms explicitly into their performance standards largely
failed. Rather than looking to those international norms, the IFC created its own
stand-alone set of performance standards. 12 Although most international
environmental agreements are not written specifically to apply to the World
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World Bank, OperationalPolicies: EnvironmentalAssessmentat

3 (cited in note 2).
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See Durbin, et al, Shaping the Future of Sustainable Finance (cited in note 71) (evaluating commercial
banks' sustainable finance standards against a normative framework derived from international
environmental agreements and other multi-stakeholder initiatives). See also Morgera, 18 Colo J
Intl Envir L & Poly at 183 (cited in note 23).
125 For a general discussion, see Handl, 92 Am J Intl L at 642 (cited in note 7). See also Shihata, 17
Denver J Intl L & Poly at 39 (cited in note 102); Morgera, 18 Colo J Intl Envir L & Poly at 18384 (cited in note 23) (noting the failure of the IFC to adopt the precautionary approach or the
requirement of prior informed consent, despite both being recognized in international
instruments).
126 See Andrea Durbin, et al, Summary of Comments Regarding IFC's Proposed Poliy on Social &
Environmental Sustainabiy and Performance Standards, (Dec 2004), available online at
<http://www.grrr-now.org/doc/Dec%20Comments%20on%201FC%20Draft%/20E&S%20
Policy.doc> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also Handl, 92 Am J Intl L at 664 (cited in note 7)
(concluding MDBs have a "clear international legal obligation to avoid causing environmental
harm in developing member countries..
127 NGO GapsAnalysis (cited in note 94).
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Bank or other financial institutions, CSOs argue that they nonetheless provide
sufficiently clear norms that should be applied to the IFIs. 128
To the extent that environmental and social standards are internal
standards meant only for the operations of the underlying financial institution,
they fulfill a relatively narrow administrative function. But many sustainable
finance standards, particularly those of the IFC, are decidedly not, nor intended
to be, limited to constraining the behavior of the underlying institution. The
standards are directed at the borrowers from these institutions. 29 Thus, the
World Bank safeguard policies set out norms aimed at constraining the behavior
of borrower governments at least with respect to the projects they implement
with World Bank funds. Similarly, the IFC's eight "Performance Standards"
establish normative conditions on the private sector lenders from the IFC. 13 ° So,
too, the ECAs' environmental standards set normative requirements for their
private sector clients as do the new environmental standards established by
private banks under the Equator Principles.
Like more traditional forms of international environmental law, sustainable
finance standards also have a role in constraining and changing the behavior of
states in which they operate. They provide leverage against recalcitrant national
governments to promote environmental protection and respect human rights, at
least in specific projects. In many countries, MDB-financed projects are arguably
implemented in more environmentally and socially sound ways than projects
where MDBs are not involved. Indeed, the banks often invoke this argument as
justification for staying engaged in controversial projects-that they will make
admittedly environmentally destructive projects less harmful.'
Reform of
MDBs is thus not really, or at least not only, about reforming the banks, but
rather about promoting more sustainable practices in developing countries.
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See About GRRR, available online at <http://www.grrr-now.org/?action=showpagemid=21>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
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Standards, in Dinah Shelton, ed, Commitment and Copliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the
InternationalLegal System 281 (Oxford 2000).
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Unlike norms created by treaties, however, sustainable finance norms are not
necessarily intended to be reflected in the national or subnational laws of the
borrowing or host state. The focus has historically been on the performance of
the project, and not on the country's policy framework. In this way,
environmental and social standards are viewed as conditions for the financial
resources provided to the specific projects, and in many cases are enshrined or
referenced in the underlying loan documents.
This focus on the project level avoids some of the sovereignty claims that
arise over the development and implementation of these standards. In this
respect, the "consent" that is typically the sine qua non of international law is not
found in the adoption of a treaty or even the adoption of the policies, but in the
country's decision to accept the F1 funding and thereby the environmental and
social conditions. Although this does reflect some sense of fairness-countries
are free to reject lending conditioned on sustainability-until recently at least the
MDBs and ECAs consisted of the large majority of project-finance support
available to most large projects in developing countries. Many developing
country governments argue correctly that they have no real choice in whether to
take World Bank lending and thus that the conditions are essentially imposed on
them. Adding to their sense of injustice is that these environmental and social
standards only apply to projects in developing countries, either because
development institutions such as the World Bank only operate in developing
countries or because the standards (in the case, for example, of the Equator
Principles) only apply to projects in non-OECD countries. 3 2
These developing country concerns over environmental and social
conditionality on project finance reflect deeper concerns over the "democratic
deficit" that exists in the decisionmaking of the World Bank and other MDBs.'33
Nor does an expanded role for civil society necessarily resolve the democratic
deficit. To some extent, northern CSOs may have more capacity and better
access to FIs than do developing countries, particularly the least developed.
132
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The World Bank in a Changing World 236 (Kluwer 1995). A former World Bank General Counsel
notes:
In today's world, the World Bank is in fact playing the role of a monitor for
the protection of the environment with respect to the projects it finances in its
borrowing Member Countries. Increasingly, it also supports broader efforts to
save the environment in these countries and to address the effects of their
actions on the global environment. Regrettably, no other international
organization plays a similar role for the countries which do not borrow from
the Bank, and to whom most of the damage to the world environment has
been attributed.
See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., GlobaliZation's Democratic Deficit: How to Make International
Institutions More Accountable, Foreign Aff 2 (July/Aug 2001).
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Moreover, CSO networks do not purport to reflect southern government
positions, but rather seek to promote the interests of project-affected
communities. If these communities are opposing an internationally financed
project, they are likely also opposing the official position of their national
government. In this way, developing country governments argue that greater
CSO participation can further diminish the government's influence in F1
decisionmaking.
D. COMPLIANCE: THE "HARDNESS"

OF THESE STANDARDS

As we consider the role of sustainable finance standards, we should
evaluate their relative "hardness," or binding nature. As Phillip Allott suggests,
"law constrains or it is a travesty to call it law."' 34 In this regard, sustainable
finance standards cannot be viewed as binding international law, but we should
look beyond this formalism to investigate whether the norms come attached to
mechanisms that can enforce them or at least strongly encourage compliance.
This discussion of compliance also goes to the core of much of the policy
debate around such standards. If there is no compliance, then such voluntary
industry standards become vulnerable to legitimate concerns of greenwash.'35
Interestingly, the sustainable finance standards come with an inherent
potential compliance mechanism, and in this way may be "harder" law than
many of the treaties established through state-to-state negotiations. In theory,
environmental and social norms are expected to be enshrined in underlying loan
agreements or accompanying documentation.'3 6 The various FIs-at least in
theory-can pursue remedies under the loan agreements for failing to meet the
environmental and social norms. In the case of loans between sovereign states
and MDBs like the World Bank, the loans are themselves considered treaties
and, thus, to the extent that environmental and social policies are reflected in the
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Philip Allott, Eunomia xvii (Oxford 1990).
The MacMillan online dictionary provides the following definition of greenwash: "to try to
convince people that you are doing something which is good for the environment by being
involved in small, environmentally-friendly initiatives, especially as a way of hiding your
involvement in activities which are damaging to the environment," available online at
<http://www.macmillandictionary.com/New-Words/050110-greenwash.htm> (visited Nov 17,
2007).
See, for example, Shihata, 2 The World Bank and the Environment at 207-08 (cited in note 132)
(explaining the options available to the Bank for enforcement of environmental conditions);
Kevin Huyser, Note, Sustainable Development: Rhetoric and Reform at the World Bank, 4 Transnatl L &
Contemp Probs 253, 272-73 (1994) (arguing that the Bank is well-positioned to strengthen
international environmental practice by refusing funds to countries that do not comply with
environmental assessment policies).
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agreements, they have "hardened.' 137 A similar result is possible with respect to
private sector borrowing. Borrowers from the IFC, for example, are expected to
develop an action plan to meet the Performance Standards, and that action plan
is an integral part of the project to be incorporated into the loan agreements.
These contractual remedies could force borrowers, public or private, to comply
or to risk defaulting on the loans. In some instances, the sustainable finance
standards are also supposed to be applied by the borrower to project suppliers.
Thus, standards can be extended through procurement contracts to the entire
supply chain of a project.'38 This is in some ways a more robust form of
enforcement than is available under many multilateral environmental agreements
and is a clear international example of the growing practice of private contract
139
being used to ensure public interest outcomes.
Of course, this point can be overstated: even by the Bank's own account,
supervision of environmental conditions is rare, and the Bank must rely on other
forms of persuasion. As stated by the World Bank's former General Counsel,
Ibrahim Shihata:
Appropriate covenants in the legal documents do not of course ensure by
themselves that the required action will be taken. For this reason, provisions
are included in the General Conditions applicable to all loan agreements to
give the Bank power to suspend disbursements if the borrower or the
project executing agency defaults in carrying out agreed actions. This is a
most potent remedy when project implementation is still ongoing. Problems
that arise after the completion of the project and the full disbursement of
loan proceeds to the borrower are more difficult to handle. However, the
Bank may in such a case still enforce the borrower's commitments by
declaring that the borrower has defaulted in performing its obligations
under the loan agreement. This could lead, if acceptable action is not taken
by the borrower within the period indicated by the Bank, to the acceleration
of maturity of the loan and the Bank's insistence on immediate repayment
of the loan in full. This is obviously a serious path which has been avoided
in practice, although such defaults do affect the level and pace of future
Bank operations in the country in question. 14°
Although enforcing environmental conditions by threatening loan defaults
is rare, the FIs presumably can use their leverage more generally in gaining
compliance. Continued access to the FIs' capital might in some circumstances
137

Consider Boisson de Chazournes, Poli Guidance and Compliance at 282 (cited in note 129).
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See, for example, IFC, Poliy and Pe formance Standards on Social & EnvironmentalSustainability (cited
in note 3). For a general discussion, see Michael Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of
Private Contractingin Global Governance, 54 UCLA L Rev 913 (2007) (on the role of private contracts
to enforce environmental and other social values).
For a general discussion, see David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking 64 Ohio St L J 371 (2003); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543 (2000).
Shihata, 2 The World Bank and the Environment at 207-08 (cited in note 132).
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present sufficiently strong incentives for the borrowers (be they countries from
the World Bank or private borrowers from Citibank) to comply with the
environmental and social conditions. 4'
In addition to the use of the loan agreements to enforce environmental and
social standards, some of the FIs have created citizen-based accountability
mechanisms for the express purpose of ensuring compliance. Beginning with the
1993 creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel, affected citizens have been
given new rights to hold international institutions accountable for compliance
with their policies and procedures. 42 Today citizens enjoy enforcement
mechanisms at six multilateral FIs143 and three bilateral FIs'" where they can
seek to enforce the institutions' environmental and social standards. Each of
these enforcement mechanisms differs, but they all provide local people with an
opportunity to seek the institution's compliance with applicable environmental
and social policies. The conception of these mechanisms emanated from CSOs
and academics who recognized the need for enhanced citizen involvement in
international institutions. These mechanisms were viewed both as a response to
the international organizations' immunity and as a way to ensure that those
people most affected by the organizations' activities have a mechanism to ensure
their rights and interests under the policies were met. CSO approaches to these
mechanisms reflect their view that the sustainable finance standards are primarily
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Id at 208.
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IBRD, Inspection Panel,34 ILM at 511 (cited in note 18). For a general discussion of how the Panel
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operates, see Dana L. Clark, A Citizen's Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel(CIEL 2d ed 1999).
The six citizen enforcement mechanisms include: (1) the World Bank Inspection Panel; (2) the
International Finance Corporation's Compliance Advisor and Ombudsman, see Office of the
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, OperationalGuideines (Apr 2007); (3) the Asian Development
Bank's Accountability Mechanism, see Asian Development Bank, Review of the Inipection Function:
Establishment of a New ADB Accountabilio Mechanism (May 2003); (4) the Inter-American
Development Bank's Independent Investigation Mechanism, see Inter-American Development
Bank, The IDB Independent Investigation Mechanism, Rules and Procedures(une 2000); (5) the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Independent Recourse Mechanism, see European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism: Rules of Procedure(Apr 6,
2004); and (6) the African Development Bank's Independent Review Mechanism, see African
Development Bank, Independent Review Mechanism, Res B/BD/2004/9-F/BD/2004/7 (June 30,
2004).
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The three bilateral financial institutions are (1) the Japan Bank for Investment Cooperation's
Compliance Examiners, see Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Major Rules (cited in note
59); (2) the Environment Development Canada's Compliance Officer, see Export Development
Canada, Resolutions Respecting the Compliance Officer (cited in note 59); and (3) the US Overseas
Private Investment Corporation's Office of Accountability, see OPIC Office ofAccountabiliy (cited
in note 59).

Winter 2008

Chicago Journalof InternationalLaw

meant to provide procedural
•• 141
communities.

and substantive rights

to project-affected

The compliance mechanisms present in the structure of international
finance-for example, the ability to enforce environmental and social standards
through loan conditionality or through F1 accountability mechanisms-may
provide new approaches for enforcing other environmental norms. To the
extent that violations of sustainable finance standards correspond with violations
of international or national environmental law, national environmental
enforcement agencies may be able to expand their enforcement reach through
cooperation with the FIs. The threats from a project's banks that they may hold
a loan in default or withhold future financial support may provide additional
enforcement weight behind the often beleaguered compliance and enforcement
efforts of national environmental officials.
E. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE SUSTAINABLE
FINANCE STANDARDS

Despite the clear success of CSO efforts in promoting sustainable finance
standards at many FIs, questions still remain as to whether these standards have
been successful in improving development effectiveness generally and avoiding
environmental and social impacts more specifically.146 Ultimately policy reform is
only a means to an end-with the end in the case of Fl reform being improved
performance either at the project or portfolio level.
Anecdotal evidence exists that the environmental and social standards have
improved project performance in specific instances. Although projects are rarely
stopped altogether, many controversial and environmentally or socially

disruptive projects have likely been improved as a result of the dialogue
surrounding their compliance with sustainable finance standards. Some projects
have been denied F1 financing because of environmental and social concerns,
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For more information regarding these mechanisms, see Clark, Fox and Treakle, eds, Demanding
Accountabilio (cited in note 21); Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank Inpection Panel In Practice (Oxford
2d ed 2000); Daniel Bradlow, International OtganiZaionsand Private Complainants:The Case of the World
Bank Inspection Panel,34 VaJ Ind L 553 (1994); Lori Udall, The World Bank Insection PaneL A Three
Year Review (Bank Info Ctr 1997); Gudmundur Alfredsson and Rolf Ring, eds, The Inspection Panel
of the World Bank: A Different ComplaintsProcedure (Martinus Nijhoff 2001); Accountabiiy at the World
Bank (cited in note 106); David Hunter, Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of
Project-Affected People, 4 Chi J Intl L 201 (2003); Suzuki and Nanwani, 27 Mich J Intl L 177 (cited in
note 98); Daniel Bradlow, Private Complainants and International Organizations: A Comparative Study of
the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International Financal Institutions, 36 Geo J Intl L 403 (2005).
For a more thorough assessment of the effectiveness of NGO advocacy on World Bank policies
and projects, see Jonathan Fox and L. David Brown, StruggleforAccountabiliy at 485-539 (cited in
note 8).
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including the Three Gorges Dam in China, 47 the Arun Dam in Nepal, 148 and the
Western Poverty Reduction Project in China. 149 In many other projects, the CSO
reform effort has led to significant improvements in projects as conditions of
their approval. For example, although the World Bank Group rejected CSO
efforts to place a moratorium on the Chad-Cameroon pipeline in 2002, the Bank
did require a transparent revenue management plan and an independent review
group to ensure that oil revenues went to benefit local people and not to
purchase weapons or line the pockets of senior officials. ° Broader studies of
the project-level effectiveness of these standards are more difficult because it is
hard to know what the baseline would be without the standards. 5
Also important is whether the banks are shifting their lending portfolios
over time. Some poor, noncompliant projects might be tolerable if the presence
of environmental and social policies were moving the banks' lending in a
sustainable direction-for example, toward social programs, education, health,
and smaller scale enterprises. Measuring success at this portfolio-wide level is
difficult, or at least little empirical analysis has been done to connect shifts in the
banks' portfolios to the environmental and social policies.
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Pipeline Project, World Bank Press Release (Feb 21,
2001), available online at
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ChadCamadvisorygroup.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007). For a
discussion of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, see Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the
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(visited Nov 17,
2007). See also Review of IFC's Safeguard Policies at 7 (cited in note 22) (finding overall safeguard
policies were having a "positive effect and contributing to positive environmental and social
impacts').
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Some portfolio-wide initiatives have also had important policy results. The
World Commission on Dams 15 2 and the Extractive Industry Review for the oil,
mining, and gas sectors'5 3 were multistakeholder efforts at forming sector-wide
standards for shaping the World Bank's portfolio. The World Bank ultimately
rejected many of the key recommendations from both efforts, but these
5 4
initiatives continue to shape international policy discussions in these sectors'
There have also been important portfolio-wide sectoral discussions internally at
the Bank. For example, CSOs won several major concessions on getting the
Bank to promote energy efficiency in recent years, although the Bank failed to
commit to numerical targets for its portfolio. 55
Perhaps more important than direct engagement on the Bank's approach
to certain sectors has been the impact of the environmental and social
safeguards in making some types of projects too risky. Strong anecdotal
evidence suggests that CSO efforts to strengthen policies and highlight
controversial infrastructure projects did have a substantial impact on Bank
lending directions and portfolios. For example, for more than a decade
beginning in the mid-1990s the World Bank financed virtually no large dams,
15 6
primarily because of how risky such dams are seen for the Bank's reputation.
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(Nov 2000), available online at <http://www.dams.org/report/> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
153 See Extractive Industry Review, Striking a Better Balance: The World Bank Group and Extractive
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Industries: The Final Report of the Extractive Industry Review, (Dec 2003), available online at
<http://iris36.worldbank.org/domdoc/PRD/Other/PRDDContainer.nsf/A+Documents/852
56D240074B56385256FF6006843AB/$File/volumelenglish.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
See Navroz K. Dubash, et al, A Watershed in Global Governance? An Independent Assessment of the
World Commission on Dams 104-06 (World Resources 2001) (discussing the World Bank's response
to the WCD); World Bank Group, Implementation of the Management Response to the Extractive Industries
Review, (Dec 2006), available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/
Resources/implementationtomr2.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (setting forth the status of the
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World Bank Group's Extractive Industries Review Implementation Report, (Feb 2007), available online at
<http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3127.aspx> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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(June 5, 2004), available online at <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0605-05.htm>
(visited Nov 17, 2007). See also Bank Information Center, et al, World Bank's Energy Framework
Sells the Climate and Poor People Short (Sept 18, 2006), available online at <http://www.bicusa.org/
en/Article.2954.aspx> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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dams around the world). For a general discussion, see World Commission on Dams, Dams and
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The Bank also until recently had a prohibition against financing any logging
project in tropical rainforests," 7 as a direct response to CSO activism around the
logging of the Amazon. Whatever progress had been made in greening the
Bank's portfolio in the late 1990s, however, has been reversed somewhat in
recent years as the Bank announced a new "high risk/high reward" strategy that
hailed its return to large infrastructure projects.158 This move has been widely
criticized by CSOs who believe it will result in large-scale environmental and
social harm. 9
V. CONCLUSION
Although the substantive impact of these standards on international
finance is important, ultimately the process of developing these standards may
have more lasting impact as part of the more general pressure for democratizing
international environmental law as well as the law of international institutions.
Many of the antiglobalization street demonstrations of the late 1990s found
expression as well in calls for policy reforms that expanded the participatory
rights of CSOs and project-affected communities. Information disclosure
policies, policies requiring consultation, and the accountability mechanisms
described above all expanded citizen rights in international lawmaking and in the
practice of international organizations.16 ° From the perspective of the citizens,
these procedural policies embodied participatory rights that have contributed
markedly to the development of global administrative law. 6' More generally,
these democratic reforms and pressures have helped to redefine the definition of
stakeholders in international project finance. Most FIs, even those with
development missions, inherently tend to think of their borrowers as their sole
or primary stakeholder. The debate around sustainable finance standards,
including the associated interaction with CSOs, ultimately refocuses the FIs on a
broader definition of stakeholder--one that includes most critically those local
communities most affected by the projects they finance.
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